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Abstract. The Quantum Kolkata restaurant problem is a multiple-choice version of the quantum
minority game, where a set of n non-communicating players have to chose between one of m
choices. A payoff is granted to the players that make a unique choice. It has previously been shown
that shared entanglement and quantum operations can aid the players to coordinate their actions
and acquire higher payoffs than is possible with classical randomization. In this paper the initial
quantum state is expanded to a family of GHZ-type states and strategies are discussed in terms of
possible final outcomes. It is shown that the players individually seek outcomes that maximize the
collective good.
Keywords: quantum game theory, quantum games, qutrit, local quantum operations, kolkata
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INTRODUCTION
Games and framework
Game theory is the study of systematic and strategic decision-making in interactive
situations of conflict and cooperation. The models are widely used in economics, po-
litical science, biology and computer science to capture the behavior of individual par-
ticipants in terms of responses to strategies of the rest. The field attempts to describe
how decision makers do and should interact within a well-defined system of rules to
maximize their satisfaction with the outcome [1, 2, 3]. A game is a model of the strate-
gies of these decision makers or players as we will call them, in terms of choices
made by each of them. They are assumed to all have individual preference profiles
σx1  σx2  ·· ·  σxm over a set of m outcomes {σx j}, where ′  ′ should be inter-
preted as "preferred by", and the x j’s as indices for possible outcomes. An outcome or
strategy profile σ ∈ Sn× Sn−1× ·· · × S1 = S is equivalent to the combination of the
strategies sij ∈ Si of the participants, where sij is the j’th strategy of player i, Si the set of
strategies or choices available to that player and S the set of all possible strategy profiles.
In order to evaluate the profit or satisfaction of player i with regards to a strategy profile
we need to define for each player a payoff function $i that takes a strategy profile σ as
input and outputs a real numerical value as a measure of desirability. We have $ : S→R
and $i(σk)≥ $i(σl)⇔ σk i σl . The question to answer is, what should rational players
choose to do given that they have partial or complete information of the content of S
and the payoff functions $i? The main approach is to find a solution concept, with the
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most famous one being the Nash Equilibrium, where all players simply make the choice
sij that is the best possible response to any configuration in S/Si, i.e to any combination
of strategies by their counter-parties. In situations where such equilibrium does not ex-
ist one needs to extend the game to allow for mixed (probabilistic) strategies where the
players extend the sets Si to ∆(Si), i.e the set of convex combinations of the sij’s to ac-
quire one. Just as classical probability distributions extend pure strategy games to mixed
ones, quantum probabilities, operations and entanglement can extend the framework to
outperform any classical setup.
Quantum games
A quantum game is defined by a set Γ of objects and the relationships between them:
Γ= {ρQ,HQ,n,Si,$i} for i= 1, · · · ,n (1)
where HQ is the Hilbert space of the composite quantum system, ρQ is the initial
state of the game defined on HQ, n is the number of players, Si the set of available
strategies of player i and $i the payoffs available to player i for each game outcome. In
our quantum game protocol the mi different pure strategies available to a player i will be
encoded in the basis states of an mi-level quantum system ρQi ∈HQi . With n players
we’ll end up needing a initial quantum state ρQ ∈HQ =HQn⊗HQn−1 · · ·⊗HQ1 with
dim(HQ) =∏ni=1 dim(HQi) to accommodate for all possible game outcomes [4].
The strategies are chosen and played by each player trough the application of a unitary
operator Ui ∈ Si = S(mi) on their own sub-systems, where the set of allowed quantum
operations S(mi) is some subset of the special unitary group SU(mi). The general
procedure of a quantum game consists of a transformation of the composite initial
state trough local unitary operations by the players: Un⊗Un−1⊗·· ·⊗U1 :HQ→HQ.
Followed by a measurement outcome, or in terms of pre-measurement reasoning, an
expectation value: $ :HQ→ R.
QUANTUM KOLKATA RESTAURANT PROBLEM
This is a general form of a minority game [5, 6, 7], where n non-communicating agents
(players), have to choose between m choices. A payoff of $ = 1 is payed out to the
players that make unique choices. Players making the same choice receive $ = 0. The
challenge is to come up with a strategy profile that maximizes the expected payoffs Ei($)
of all players i, and has the property of being a Nash equilibrium. In the absence of
communication, in a classical framework, there is nothing else to do, but to randomize.
Collective aim in the quantum case
It has been shown for the case of three players and three choices in the quantum
setting, starting with a GHZ-type state |ψin〉 = 1√3 (|000〉+ |111〉+ |222〉), that shared
entanglement and local SU(3) operations (by the players on their own subsystems) will
lead to a expected payoff E($) = 23 . This is a 50% increase compared to the classical
payoff of 49 reachable trough randomization. Although the details of the protocol can
be found in [8], it is instructive to jump back a couple steps. Since we have three
players with three allowed pure choices the Hilbert space we are dealing with is the
space of three qutrit states; with a basis B = {|i jk〉}; i, j,k ∈ {0,1,2}, each of which
representing a post-measurement outcome of the game, where i, j,k denotes the final
choices of players 1,2,3 respectively. We have span(B) = {∑2i, j,k=0 ai jk|i jk〉 : i, j,k =
0,1,2 and ai jk ∈C} which with a normalization condition gives us the complete Hilbert
space of the game. We can divide B into subsets that are interesting from the point of
view of the possible outcomes:
L = {|000〉, |111〉, |222〉}, (2)
G = {|012〉, |120〉, |201〉, |021〉, |102〉, |210〉}, (3)
D1 = {|011〉, |022〉, |100〉, |122〉, |200〉, |211〉}, (4)
D2 = {|101〉, |202〉, |010〉, |212〉, |020〉, |121〉}, (5)
D3 = {|110〉, |220〉, |001〉, |221〉, |002〉, |112〉}, (6)
where L contains all states for which none the players 1,2,3 receive any payoff. It is
thus a collective objective to avoid these states. G contains all those states that returns a
payoff $ = 1 to the three of them and the sets Di contains the post-measurement states
leads to a payoff $ = 1 for player i and $ = 0 to players 6= i. Thus the general goal of
each player i is to maximize the probability of the post-measurement outcome to be a
state in Gi = G∪Di. Starting with an initial state |ψin〉, each player i ∈ 1,2,3 applies an
operator from its set of allowed strategies Si ⊆ SU(3), transforming it to its final state
|ψ f in〉 =U1⊗U2⊗U3|ψin〉. The expected payoff E($i) of player i is the probability of
the post-measurement outcome to be a state in Gi:
E($i) = ∑
|ξ 〉∈Gi
∣∣〈ψ f in|ξ 〉∣∣2 . (7)
Given that we have an initial state in span(L) containing all states of the form |ψin〉=
α|000〉+ β |111〉+ γ|222〉 with α,β ,γ ∈ C (We will assume 0 ≤ α,β ,γ ∈ R later for
simplicity), what is the rational aim of player i? First, note that all states in span(L) are
unbiased with regards of change in player positions. We can assume that they don’t even
know which qutrit they control since that knowledge doesn’t add any useful information
for the choice of Ui ∈ Si. Second, any choice of Ui aimed at increasing the probability
of post-measurement state to end up being in Di must due to the symmetry of the setup
increase the probability of the state being in D j 6=i∨k∪Dk 6=i∨ j with 2:1. Third, an outcome
in G=G1∩G2∩G3 is as favorable as any outcome in Di for player i. It follows therefore
that the players should aim for producing a state in span(G) to the extent this is possible.
Although it was shown in [8] that they fail to fully depart from span(L), whereby they
reach a maximum payoff of E($) = 23 rater than E($) = 1 for α = β = γ =
1√
3
, with a
FIGURE 1. Payoffs associated with optimal strategies in a three player game with a variable initial
state. The expected payoff E($) decreases as the level of entanglement decreases.
final state of the following form:
| ψ f in〉= 13 (|000〉+ |012〉+ |021〉+ |102〉+
|111〉+ |120〉+ |201〉+ |210〉+ |222〉) . (8)
Expected payoffs for initial states in span(L)
Due to the symmetries mentioned in the previous section the three players will have
to chose a unitary operator U that takes states from span(L) to span(L∪G), without the
possibility to favor any subset of G (even if that possibility existed, that would only put
a roof for the individual payoffs and any choice of subset other than the whole would
decrease the expected payoff, due to the lack of coordination the choice of subset). This
leads to the conclusion that there exists a U (fixed up to a global phase) for any initial
state |ψin〉= α|000〉+β |111〉+ γ|222〉, that maximizes the individual expected payoffs
and is a Nash equilibrium solution, since any departure from this strategy will lead to a
lower payoff. We have:
Emax($) = ∑
|ξ 〉∈G
∣∣∣〈ψ f in|U†⊗U†⊗U†|ξ 〉∣∣∣2 , (9)
simultaneously for all three of them. Figure 1 shows numerically calculated expected
payoffs E($) for α = sinϑ cosϕ; β = sinϑ sinϕ; γ = cosϑ where ϕ = pi40M,ϑ =
pi
40N
and M,N = 1,2, · · · ,20. A total of 400 optimizations with equally many different as-
sociated operators UMN . We see that the expected payoff is maximized for ϕ = pi4 and
ϑ = cos−1 1√
3
, where the initial state is maximally entangled, and falls off towards the
classical expected payoff as the entanglement decreases.
CONCLUSIONS
The ambition of self-maximization in the studied Kolkata restaurant problem leads
individual players to act in such way that the collective good is maximized. The game is
symmetric with regards to permutations of player positions which guides the participants
to aim for a set of outcomes that favors them all. The expected payoff reachable trough
local operations changes with the level of entanglement in the initial state.
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